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I. INTRODUCTION
With judicial elections looming, he decides to try to
purchase himself a seat on the Court. The cost is a
few million dollars, a drop in the bucket for a
billionaire. . . . [H]is political operatives recruit a
young, unsuspecting candidate. . . and mold him into
a potential Supreme Court Justice. Their Supreme
Court Justice.'
If this storyline seems like it is right out of a legal fiction novel,
it's because it is. The history and facts of Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), decided in June of 2009, is eerily
similar to John Grisham's The Appeal; the main difference being the
ending. 2 In both Caperton and Grisham's novel, the story starts with
a large jury verdict with millions of dollars in damages being
awarded against the defendant corporation.3 The following political
and legal actions are what created a literary best seller and a case for
the United States Supreme Court.
In Caperton, the respondents (Massey) were found by a West
Virginia jury to have committed fraud, misrepresentation,
concealment, and tortious interference with the petitioner's
(Caperton) contractual relations.4 For these actions, the jury gave a
judgment of fifty million dollars in damages to Caperton, from which
Massey appealed.5 During the appeal process, West Virginia had its
* Richard is a third year law student at Pepperdine University's School of law.
He recently was a part of Pepperdine's national championship team which won the
American Bar Association's labor and employment moot court trial competition in
Washington D.C. Additionally, he is a recipient of Pepperdine's Barrister Award
which is given to the top student advocates of the law school. Richard has also
worked on numerous legal articles with California Superior Court Judge Maureen
Duffy-Lewis, and as probably guessed, he is also a John Grisham fan. He sends
additional thanks to NAALJ editors Anson Cain, Sadaf Bathaee and the rest of the
NAALJ staff for their help, patience, and continuous corrections.
1. John Grisham, Preface to JoHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008).
2. See generally Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
3. See generally id. See also Grisham, supra note 1.
4. Caperton, 129 S. Ct at 2257.
5. Id.
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2004 judicial elections for the State's Supreme Court.6 In the
outcome of that election, Brent Benjamin (Benjamin), a civil litigator
with no prior judicial experience,7 unseated incumbent Justice
Warren McGraw.8  The election was decided by less than fifty
thousand votes.9 In isolation, this election would not seem to be
relevant to the Caperton appeal, but because Massey's chairman,
chief executive officer, and president, Don Blankenship
(Blankenship) donated a total of three million dollars to Benjamin's
election campaign,10 questions of impartiality and a due process
6. Id.
7. Before his election, Benjamin was an attorney with Robinson and
McElwee, PLLC in Charleston, West Virginia. Project Vote Smart, Chief Justice
Brent D. Benjamin - Biography, http://www.votesmart.org/bio.php?can-id=59134
(last visited Feb. 11, 2009). His twenty-year practice at that firm involved general
civil litigation, including toxic torts and complex litigation. Id. His civil rights
practice focused on protecting children from physical and sexual abuse. Id. He
was elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in November 2004
when he received fifty-three percent of the votes. Id. He began a twelve-year term
on January 1, 2005, serving as an associate justice from 2005 to 2009, and is
currently the chief justice. Id.
8. In fairness, Justice McGraw did spend a large amount, around one million
dollars, for the campaign and made a "number of controversial claims" that could
have hurt his popularity with the voters. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264
9. Id. at 2257.
10. Id. Blankenship spent one million dollars more than the total amount
spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined. Blankenship's
donations did not break any political or campaign regulations because he was able
to spread the donations out through numerous organizations, all which were tied to
Benjamin:
In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to
Benjamin's campaign committee, Blankenship donated almost
$2.5 million to 'And For The Sake Of The Kids,' a political
organization formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527. The § 527
organization opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin.
Blankenship's donations accounted for more than two-thirds of
the total funds it raised. This was not all. Blankenship spent, in
addition, just over $500,000 on independent expenditures-for
direct mailings and letters soliciting donations as well as
television and newspaper advertisements" [sic] -'to support . .
Brent Benjamin.'
Id. (citations omitted).
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violation quickly made the election and the Caperton appeal
inseparable."
When the Caperton appeal finally made its way before the West
Virginia Supreme Court, Justice Benjamin refused to recuse himself
upon Caperton's request,12 stating "that he 'carefully considered the
bases and accompanying exhibits proffered by the movants' [b]ut ...
found 'no objective information ... to show ... bias for or against
any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters . .. or that this
Justice will be anything but fair and impartial."" 3  On appeal, the
majority reversed the trial court's decision, based on procedural
grounds,14 and found the fifty million dollar verdict to be non-
binding.' 5  In their dissents, Justice Starcher stated that "the
majority's opinion [was] morally and legally wrong,"' 6 while Justice
Albright expressed that the majority had applied "sweeping 'new
law' into our jurisprudence that may well come back to haunt us, or
more likely, haunt the people we are duty-bound to protect under our
law."' 7 Upon a rehearing, Justice Starcher pushed Justice Benjamin
to recuse himself, stressing that "'Blankenship's bestowal of his
personal wealth, political tactics, and "friendship" have created a
cancer in the affairs of this Court."" 8  Again, Benjamin refused.19
However, Justices Maynard and Starcher did recuse themselves
which left Benjamin as the acting chief justice;20 a position which let
11. See generally id.
12. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
13. Id.
14. Id. ("[T]hat a forum-selection clause contained in a contract to which
Massey was not a party barred the suit in West Virginia, and, second, that res
judicata barred the suit due to an out-of-state judgment to which Massey was not a
party.").
15. Id.
16. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119, at *104 (W.
Va. Nov. 21, 2007) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
17. Id (Albright, J., dissenting) ("Congratulations to the majority. It has
decided this case for the sake of Massey by protecting A.T. Massey Coal
Company.").
18. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
19. Id.
20. Justice Maynard recused himself on appeal after vacation pictures from
the French Riviera surfaced showing Maynard and Blankenship together; the
vacation occurred during the pendency of the trial. Id. at 2258. Justice Starcher
30-1
him name the replacements for the vacant court seats.2 In a final
attempt to exclude Justice Benjamin from hearing the case, Caperton
again filed for Justice Benjamin's recusal, stating he had applied an
"incorrect legal standard" for recusal, in that West Virginia requires
recusal when "a reasonable and prudent person, knowing the[]
objective facts, would harbor doubts about [a judge's] ability to be
fair and impartial."22 Justice Benjamin again refused, and again on
appeal found the trial court's decision to be erroneous. 23 Justice
Benjamin defended his interpretation of the West Virginia laws
dealing with recusal, and justified his decision to deny such action by
stating that "[a]dopting 'a standard merely of appearances ... seems
little more than an invitation to subject West Virginia's justice system
to the vagaries of the day-a framework in which predictability and
stability yield to supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan
manipulations."' 24 In the dissent, Justices Albright and Cookman-
replacement justices for one of the two justices who had been
recused-voiced their concern of a due process violation stemming
from Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself.25 That refusal of
seemingly recused himself for a more admirable cause, because of his public
criticism of Blankenship's role in the 2004 elections; he did not want his duty of
impartiality to be questioned. See id.
21. Id. ("Justice Benjamin, now in the capacity of acting chiefjustice, selected
Judges Cookman and Fox to replace the recused justices.").
22. Id. Caperton supplied additional support for the recusal motion when the
court was given the findings of a West Virginia opinion poll taken on the matter:
Caperton also included the results of a public opinion poll, which
indicated that over 67% of West Virginians doubted Justice
Benjamin would be fair and impartial. Justice Benjamin again
refused to withdraw, noting that the "push poll" was "neither




24. See id. at 2259.
25. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 264 (2008) (Albright,
J., dissenting) ("The new test was applied ... with gross disregard for the due
process rights of the litigants. Not only is the majority opinion unsupported by the
facts and existing case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was
neither honored nor served by the majority."), rev'd en banc, 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009).
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recusal (I know it sounds funny when you say it out loud) and the
concerns over a lack of due process led the Supreme Court to grant a
Writ of Certiorari, and to review Justice Benjamin's decision to hear
the dispute between Caperton and Massey.26
The Supreme Court's decision and its law-expanding
implications are analyzed in this case note. However, this note not
only considers the legal impact of the Caperton decision, but also
includes the possible political and societal impacts which join those
legal ones. Section II of the note shows the different areas which
have traditionally governed judicial recusal, and how the decision in
Caperton affects those areas.27 Section III discusses the relevant
case-law which the Court relied upon in granting its decision.28
Section IV analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions. 29 Section
V compares Caperton with another of the Court's recent rulings and
discusses their differences, along with the possible effects and
implications which the Caperton decision could have on many
Americans.30 Section VI concludes the note.31 While this note may
not be a John Grisham novel, hopefully the details and possible
outcomes will spark your intrigue to realize the effects are farther
reaching then a single case or even a New York Times best seller.
Imagination isn't needed with these types of facts; enjoy.
II. RESOURCES To DRAw UPON FOR JUDICIAL RECUSAL
A. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Locating
Precedent
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 32 Due process was challenged
26. See generally Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252.
27. See infra notes 32-92 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 93-139 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 140-231 and accompanying text. Note that there were no
concurring opinions in the Caperton decision.
30. See infra notes 232-259 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 260-263 and accompanying text.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause guarantees due
process of the law applies to the individual states as well as the federal government.
See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early
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in Caperton because of the appearance of impartiality, which was
caused by the large amounts of political contributions received by
Justice Benjamin from Massey's president, Blankenship. 33 Justice
Benjamin's insistence on hearing the appeal between Caperton and
Massey, despite his possible appearance of bias, caused too much
noise and fear of unfair deprivation of property for the Supreme
Court to ignore. 34  Accusations that Justice Benjamin had been
"bought" and was being controlled by Massey, or at least that
Benjamin owed too great a debt of gratitude to let him be impartial,
sparked concerns (to put it mildly) of a Due Process violation.
However, the matter was not a clear due process infringement,
because never before had the Due Process Clause been applied to
require judicial recusal when dealing with political contributions to a
judicial campaign. 36 This lack of guidance is explained by the Court
in the following statement: "Because the codes of judicial conduct
provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes
over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the
Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated in
this case will thus be confined to rare instances."3  In addition, since
states and Congress are able to adopt broader recusal standards than
the Due Process Clause covers, the Constitution is rarely relied upon
in matters concerning judicial recusal.38 The limited extent of the
Fourteenth Amendment's application to judicial disqualification is
further shown by the Court's comment from Aetna Life Ins. v.
Lavoie, which states: "[P]ersonal bias or prejudice alone" is not
Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1051 (2000). Additionally, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process guarantees to the states as a part of "selective
incorporation." See id.
33. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
36. Id. at 2262 ("This problem arises in the context of judicial elections, a
framework not presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.").
37. Id. at 2267.
38. Id at 2267-68. ("The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer
boundaries of judicial disqualification.) In his dissent, Justice Roberts noted that
"matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.").
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enough to impose a constitutional requirement of judicial recusal
under the Due Process Clause. 39 Even with the clear appearance of
possible bias and impropriety from Massey's large contributions to
Justice Benjamin's campaign, due process was not a "perfect fit." 40
With the lack of direct case guidance for the Supreme Court to
rely on in determining if political contributions could constitute a due
process violation, they used numerous, somewhat comparable, past
Supreme Court holdings to make the Caperton case analogous with
the Court's precedent. 4 1 The Court "cut and pasted" the facts from
several past judicial due process cases to make a comparable
framework for constitutional grounds. 42  This action allowed the
Court to have "federal question" jurisdiction so they were able to
hear the case.43 To explain their need to broaden the constitutional
application of due process in regards to the disqualification of judges,
the Court relied upon the knowledge of past Supreme Court Justice
White and his quote from the 1975 holding in Withrow v. Larkin:
[N]ew problems have emerged that were not discussed
at common law, however, the Court has identified
additional instances which, as an objective matter,
39. Id. at 2259 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820
(1986)). See also infra note 119 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
41. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262 ("[W]e turn to the issue before us. This
problem arises in the context of judicial elections, a framework not presented in the
precedents we have reviewed and discussed.").
42. See id.
That temptation, Caperton claims, is as strong and inherent in
human nature as was the conflict the Court confronted in Tumey
and Monroeville when a mayor-judge (or the city) benefited
financially from a defendant's conviction, as well as the conflict
identified in Murchison and Mayberry when a judge was the
object of a defendant's contempt.
Id.
43. Federal question jurisdiction is a term used to refer to the situation in
which a United States federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a civil
case because the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the Constitution, a law of the
United States, or treaties to which the United States is a party. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 394 (3d ed. 2006).
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require recusal. These are circumstances "in which
experience teaches that the probability of actual bias
on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high
to be constitutionally tolerable.""
B. State Statutory Laws
As mentioned above, the reason for the dispute as to whether or
not the Constitution is applicable to political contributions in judicial
recusal situations is based on the fact that the Constitution's
protections are usually not needed in this regard.45 The Constitution
offers the minimum amount of protection that is guaranteed to United
States citizens, but states are able to provide additional safeguards to
their populace, which most states do.46  In fact, states such as
Alabama and Mississippi have created legislation and judicial code
which deal directly with situations where judicial campaign
contributions over a certain amount or percentage will prohibit a
judge from participating in an adjudication relating to that donor.47
The Alabama code sets specific dollar amounts for judicial
campaign contributions given by lawyers which require the recusal of
44. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,47
(1975)). See also infra notes 115 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
46. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267. "States may choose to 'adopt recusal
standards more rigorous than due process requires' . . .distinguishing the
'constitutional floor' from the ceiling set 'by common law, statute, or the
professional standards of the bench and bar."' Id. (citing Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002)); see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.
899, 904 (1997).
47. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266. See also e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 12-24-1, -2
(2009) ("The Legislature intends by this chapter to require the recusal of a justice
or judge from hearing a case in which there may be an appearance of impropriety
because as a candidate the justice or judge received a substantial contribution from
a party to the case, including attorneys for the party, and all others described in
subsection (b) of Section 12-24-2."); (Miss. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(2)
(2008) ("Recusal of Judges from Lawsuits Involving Major Donors. A party may
file a motion to recuse a judge based on the fact that an opposing party or counsel
of record for that party is a major donor to the election campaign of such judge.
Such motions will be filed, considered and subject to appellate review as provided
for other motions for recusal.").
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the judge or justice if that lawyer argues before him.48 Additionally,
the same statute describes to what extent individuals will be bound if
a corporation which they are a part of is the donor.49 However, some
latitude is still given to the court when dealing with the size of
judicial contributions which do not come from a lawyer.so This
judicial determination is shown by the language of the statute which
states: "The Legislature intends by this chapter to require the recusal
of a justice or judge from hearing a case in which there may be an
appearance of impropriety because as a candidate the justice or judge
received a substantial contribution from a party to the case."5 1 The
lack of a "bright line" dollar amount gives the court some
interpretational purpose, and avoids the possible "loop hole" which
donors could take advantage of by giving just under that bright line
set amount.52
The legislatures made sure to emphasize that they "in no way
intend to suggest that any sitting justice or judge of th[e] state would
be less than fair and impartial in any case," but none the less, the law
assures public that they are protected from even the chance of
impropriety.5 3 Furthermore, the law requires that all judges or
48. ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(c) (2009).
If the action is assigned to a justice or judge of an appellate court
who has received more than four thousand dollars ($4,000) . . .,
or to a circuit judge who has received more than two thousand
dollars ($2,000)[,] .. . any opposing party . .. shall file a written
notice requiring recusal of the justice or judge.
Id.
49. ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(b). "Any holder of five percent (5%) or more of a
corporate party's stock, any employees of the party acting under that party's
direction, any insurance carrier for the party which is potentially liable for the
party's exposure in the case." Id.
50. See ALA. CODE § 12-24-1.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. A bright-line rule (or bright-line test) is a clearly defined rule or standard,
generally used in law, composed of objective factors, which leaves little or no room
for varying interpretation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (3d ed. 2006). The
purpose of a bright-line rule is to produce predictable and consistent results in its
application, and to resolve issues "simply and straightforwardly, sometimes
sacrificing equity for certainty." Id.
53. See ALA. CODE § 12-24-1.
30-1
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justices provide the secretary of state with a "statement disclosing the
names and addresses of campaign contributors and the amount of
each contribution made to him or her in the election immediately
preceding his or her new term in office."54 Contributions from
political committees must also be included in this statement.s Other
states such as, but not limited to, Georgia, Texas, New York,
Montana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Utah, and Louisiana have created,
or are in the process of ratifying similar legislation to that of
Alabama's. 56
C. Codes ofJudicial Conduct
Besides legislation, many states rely upon their code of legal
ethics and judicial canons to deal with matters like the one presented
in Caperton." As noted above, Mississippi, like many other states,
directly deals with the possibility of judicial impropriety resulting
from campaign contributions to a judge or justice through its Judicial
Codes of Conduct (Mississippi Judicial Code). Cannon three of the
Mississippi Judicial Code allows for a party to file a recusal motion
against a judge if an "opposing party or counsel of record for that
party is a major donor to the election campaign of such judge."59
Similar to the language of the Alabama statute, discussed previously,
the Mississippi Judicial Code does not define what donation amount
would make a person a "major donor." Instead, it leaves the
governing authority with the ability to judge the matter on a case-by-
case basis.60 Moreover, the statute allows the participating parties to
54. ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(a).
55. Id.
56. For a full list of state statutes dealing with Judicial disqualifications on
grounds related to political contributions, see generally National Center for State
Courts, Focus: Judicial Recusal Due to Campaign Contributions, GAVEL TO
GAVEL: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE COURTS, Mar. 12, 2009,
http://www.ncsconline.org/D Research/gaveltogavel/G%20to%20G%203-l1 .pdf.
57. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266-67 ("[S]ome States require recusal based on
campaign contributions similar to those in this case . . . . [M]ost disputes over
disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution.").
58. See supra note 48.
59. MIss. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3E(2) (2008).
60. The governing authority would most likely be the state bar association.
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waive the possible conflict after full disclosure. 6 1 This waiver
furthers the idea that, even with ties to a party who gave large
campaign contributions, judges are presumed to be honest and serve
with integrity.62
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(ABA Code) has similar restrictions to Mississippi's.63 While the
ABA Code's commentary prefers a judicial appointment system over
a judicial election system, partially because the appointed system
avoids this exact problem, the ABA Code recognizes that, in those
jurisdictions where judicial campaigns are held, candidates are forced
to raise money in order to pay for the high costs of the elections.6
The ABA Code forbids the candidate from being directly involved
with the campaign fundraising, but does allow him to set up
campaign committees to do the work, with the caveat that the
candidate will be "subject to discipline" for any improper conduct by
his campaign committee. 65 In addition, the campaign committee may
only accept "reasonable campaign contributions," and may not start
to accept or solicit any contributions until the election is within a
61. MIss. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F.
A judge who may be disqualified by the terms of Section 3E may
disclose on the record the basis of the judge's possible
disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to
consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive
disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for
disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the
judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the
judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in
the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated in the record
of the proceeding.
Id.
62. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,47 (1975).
63. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. The Mississippi's Judicial
Code is similar to the ABA 1 Code because the Mississippi code is based on the
ABA Code.
64. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt 1 (2007).
65. Id.
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year's time.66 Even with these precautions, the ABA Code identifies
the possibility of abuse which would require recusal, because of the
contribution's source and size. 67  In an attempt at full disclosure,
elected judicial figures must file a statement with the proper state
authority which lists the "name, address, occupation, and employer of
each person who has made campaign contributions to the committee
whose value in the aggregate exceed[s]" a pre-determined amount
which the state will set.6 8 The ABA Code lists many protections to
ward off abuse, or its appearance, from campaign contributions, and
some states, such as Mississippi, have adopted at least some of these
recommendations. 69  However, many states still lack regulations
which deal specifically with campaign contributions and their
potential for judicial abuse, as is shown by the actions of the West
Virginia Supreme Court in its dealings with the Caperton matter.70
As stated, Caperton originated in West Virginia, which has since
amended its Code of Judicial Conduct (Virginia Code) to somewhat
rectify the shortcoming of its silence when dealing with improper
judicial campaign contributions, which the case emphasizes. '
Before the amendment, West Virginia relied upon Canon 3(E)(l),
which as a general provision, requires a judge to "disqualify himself
or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." 72 Almost every state's code of judicial
conduct has a similar provision, but many, including West Virginia,
also incorporate specific instances which call for a judge or justice's
66. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(B)(1) ("A . .. candidate ...
shall direct his or her campaign committee: (1) to solicit and accept only such
campaign contributions as are reasonable, in any event not to exceed, in the
aggregate, [$] from any individual or [$] from any entity or organization.").
67. See supra notes 64-65. "Although lawyers and others who might appear
before a successful candidate for judicial office are permitted to make campaign
contributions, the candidate should instruct his . . . campaign committee to be
cautious . . . with such contributions, so they do not create grounds for
disqualification if . . . elected to judicial office." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt 3.
68. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(B)(3).
69. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
See also supra note 56.
71. See generally Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2252.
72. W.VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (2009).
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recusal.7 3 Specific examples requiring recusal include, but are not
limited to: a judge having a direct pecuniary interest, 74 having a
personal relationship with one of the parties, 75 or having worked for
one of the firms whose lawyer is an advocate in the case. 76 However,
many of these defined regulations seem to also be covered by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause, so their addition to
Canon law appears superfluous.7
West Virginia has amended its Code of Conduct with Cannon
5(C)(2), which addresses the Caperton problem by stating that "[a]
candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign
contributions,... [a] candidate may, however, establish committees
of responsible persons . . . [who] may solicit and accept reasonable
campaign contributions."78  The section's advisory commentary
connects the rule with Canon 3(E), in that abuse or appearance of
abuse can call for judicial disqualification. 79 West Virginia has taken
some steps to address the issue raised by Caperton, but has not
adopted the more rigorous standards laid out in the ABA's Code,8 0
nor has the State gone as far as other states such as Mississippi."'
Recent proposals to more clearly delineate and strengthen state
regulations dealing with recusal on matters tied with campaign
73. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(5) (2010).
74. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(5)(d) (stating,
"[d]isqualification of an appellate justice is also required [ifJ . . . [t]he appellate
justice, or his or her spouse or registered domestic partner, or a minor child residing
in the household, has a financial interest ... in the proceeding.").
75. W.VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(d)(i) (stating, "[a]
judge shall ... disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which .. . the judge
or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) is a party to the proceeding.").
76. W.VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(E)(1)(b).
77. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 ("[T]he Due Process Clause incorporated the
common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has 'a direct, personal,
substantial, [or] pecuniary interest' in a case." (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927))).
78. W.VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5 (C)(2) (emphasis added).
79. Id. at cmt ("campaign contributions of which a judge has knowledge,
made by lawyers or others who appear before the judge, may . .. [be relevant to]
disqualification . .. under Section 3E.").
80. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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contributions include: allowing litigants peremptory challenges
against judges for cause -much the way lawyers are able to exclude
potential jurors during voir dire; 82 changing the standard of review to
de novo during interlocutory appeals so the review can be more
"searching" and offer better "safeguard[s] against partiality infecting
decisions on recusal;"83 and independent adjudicators having the
"final say" on requests for recusal, so that judges who may have a
personal stake in the outcome of the case aren't allowed to determine
their own fate with regards to being allowed to judge the matter.84
Other proposals also include: "per se" limits on campaign
contributions which require automatic recusal or disqualification of
the adjudicator if the limits are exceeded and the party who made the
contribution is connected to the litigation;85 and at the beginning of
litigation, requiring more extensive disclosure by judges related to
campaign contributions and any other ties to parties involved in the
dispute.86
While West Virginia has not gone as far as some states when
dealing with recusal reform, there are other states, such as Michigan,
who have not even incorporated the ABA Code's general
"disqualification clause."87 California, often viewed as a liberal state
that has not shied away from providing additional safeguards to its
participants in the judicial process, seems to have taken a position
82. See Brennan Center for Justice, Recusal Standards after Caperton v.
Massey,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/recusalstandards-after caperton_
v_massey/ (July 16, 2009). Voir dire is the process by which prospective jurors are
questioned by a judge or lawyer about their backgrounds and potential biases; the
process is used to determine if the "prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a
jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 764 (3d ed. 2006).
83. See Brennan Center For Justice, supra note 82. De novo review refers to
the appellate court's authority to review the trial court's conclusions on questions of
the application, interpretation, and construction of law giving the reviewing court
great authority to fully consider all aspects of the case on appeal. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 392 (3d ed. 2006).
84. See Brennan Center For Justice, supra note 82.
85. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 1(A)(4) (2007).
86. See supra note 68.
87. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 ("A
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
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similar to West Virginia by stating that the Code's general
disqualification clause can apply to campaign contributions whose
size or source could give an "appearance of impropriety."88
California could simply amend its Code of Judicial Conduct to make
Canon 4(D)(5) applicable to campaign contributions, but many view
that step as being too harsh. 89 That section of California's Code
forbids a judge or justice from receiving any gifts given to them or
their family by a party, or their relation, who might reasonably come
before the judge.90 The problem with applying such a sweeping rule
to campaign contributions is that, as the ABA Code notes, judicial
elections are expensive and fundraising is often needed in order for a
candidate to even be competitive in an attempt to secure a seat on the
bench.9' All the same, the Caperton case has brought recusal reform
to the forefront of legal debate but, as shown, states are addressing
the issue using greatly varied means. 92
II. CASE PRECEDENT
As mentioned, no single case provided clear precedent for the
Caperton Court.93 Nonetheless, the majority supports its holding by
88. See CAL. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3) cmt (2010) (stating, "In
judicial elections, judges are neither required to shield themselves from campaign
contributions nor are they prohibited from soliciting contributions from anyone
including attorneys. Nevertheless, there are necessary limits on judges facing
election if the appearance of impropriety is to be avoided.").
89. See CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D)(5).
Under no circumstance shall a judge accept a gift, bequest, or
favor if the donor is a party whose interests have come or are
reasonably likely to come before the judge. A judge shall
discourage members of the judge's family residing in the judge's
household from accepting similar benefits from parties who have
come or are reasonably likely to come before the judge.
Id.
90. See id.
91. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 59-90 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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fusing together different aspects of several decisions.94 This medley
of prior case rulings and the resulting analysis expands the reach of
the Due Process Clause. 95
A. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
In Tumey v. Ohio, the Supreme Court reversed a man's
prohibition violation conviction by ruling that the defendant's due
process rights, which are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
were violated when the judge who adjudicated the matter had a
"direct, personal, substantial, [or] pecuniary interest in reaching [his]
conclusion." 96  That judge's decision violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause because the "defendant .. . had [a
due process] ... right to be have an impartial judge."9 7 In Tumey, the
mayor - who also acted as the town's judge - had a financial interest
in the case outcome because he was paid more for convictions than
for acquittals. 98  Actually, the mayor was only compensated for
trying the case if a conviction was given.99 Additionally, the town's
94. The cases include: Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510; Ward v. Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). See infra notes 96-139 and accompanying text.
95. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256-67 (discussing the majority's reasoning
for their holding).
96. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 ("[It] deprives a defendant . .. of due process of
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which
has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case.").
97. Id. at 535.
98. Id. at 517 ("Money arising from fines and forfeited bonds shall be paid
one-half into the state treasury credited to the general revenue fund, one-half to the
treasury of the township.. ..
99. Id. at 520.
[N]o fees or costs in such cases are paid [the Mayor] except by
the defendant if convicted. There is, therefore, no way by which
the Mayor may be paid for his service as judge, if he does not
convict those who are brought before him; nor is there any fund
from which marshals, inspectors and detectives can be paid for
their services in arresting and bringing to trial and furnishing the
evidence to convict in such cases ...
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treasury and multiple town workers were paid from the fines imposed
from the convictions.'oo Furthermore, the mayor was permitted to try
the case without a jury unless imprisonment was the punishment
sought."o0
The Court in Tumey was not persuaded by the State's argument
that the compensation was so insignificant that it could not affect the
judge's ability to be impartial.' 02 In fact, the fines "handed out" by
the judge from prohibition violations exceeded twenty thousand
dollars for just a seven month time period.'03 From that amount, the
mayor received just under seven hundred dollars.104  To put into
context what seven hundred dollars was worth at that time, if a
defendant was not able to pay the fine, he would pay it off in jail time
at a rate of sixty cents a day.'0 5
Nor was the Court convinced that judges were without fault, or
above acting on temptation, which is illustrated by Chief Justice
Taft's comment:
Id.
100. See id. at 518. The law allowed "secret service funds" from the village to
be paid to detectives, officers, marshals, and attorneys "for services in securing
evidence necessary to convict[] and prosecute[] violat[ors]" of prohibition laws.
Id. The fund which paid these parties was financed by fees and fines distributed by
the major when finding defendants guilty. Id. Therefore, these parties would not
be paid without such rulings. See id.
101. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 516-17 (noting the mayor, any other municipal judge
or "police judge, probate, or common pleas judge within the county," was given
final jurisdiction to try possible offenders of prohibition laws without a jury).
102. Id. at 524 (stating "compensation is so small that it is not to be regarded
as likely to influence improperly a judicial officer in the discharge of his duty, or as
prejudicing the defendant in securing justice, even though the magistrate will
receive nothing if the defendant is not convicted.").
103. Id. at 521 (noting that "[b]etween May 11, 1923 and December 31, 1923,
the total amount of fines for violation of the prohibition law, collected by this
village court, was upwards of $ 20,000.").
104. Id. at 522 (noting that "Mayor Pugh received $ 696.35 from these liquor
cases during that period, as his fees and costs, in addition to his regular salary.").
105. Id. at 516 (stating "[t]he Mayor exercised [authority] in this case, to order
that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs
are paid. At the time of this sentence, the prisoner received a credit of sixty cents a
day for each day's imprisonment.").
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[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial
procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of
the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could
carry it on without danger of injustice. Every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of
proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the
latter due process of law.' 06
Chief Justice Taft concluded the opinion by stating: "No matter
what the evidence was against him, he had the right to have an
impartial judge."1 0 7
The Court in Caperton relied on the Tumey decision because the
Mayor's interest in the outcome of the case "was less than what
would have been considered personal or direct at common law."108
The mayor's "pecuniary interest," along with his ambition to raise
money for the town, was enough to surpass the common law's
requirement of disqualification for an adjudicator having a "personal
interest" in the outcome of the case. This distinction was furthered in
Ward v. Monroeville, where, like in Tumey, the judge was also the
mayor.109 The Court in Monroeville found that, even though the
judge had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, his
"executive responsibilities for village finances may make him
partisan to maintain the high level of contribution [to those finances]
from the mayor's court."" 0 Similar to what the majority did in
106. Id. at 532.
107. Id. at 535.
108. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
109. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). In Ward, the mayor sat as a
judge for traffic offenses. Id. A major part of the village's income came from the
fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees handed down by the mayor. Id. at 59. Like
Tumey, the mayor's impartiality as a judge was questioned because of the income
his court derived for the town. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that it violated the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights "to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which ha[d] a direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case." Id.
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Caperton, these decisions extended due process protection to areas in
which the right had not been applied."'
Analogous to the majority's opinion in Caperton, Chief Justice
Taft stressed the use of an objective, rather than subjective, standard
of review.112 The Chief Justice questioned if the "average man"
would be tempted to put his own interest above justice." 3  In
Caperton, Justice Kennedy used this "average man" test along with
its further-developed definition from Withrow v. Larkin.114  The
Withrow Court clarified the objective test by providing that, "under a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,
[if the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment th[en]
the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented.""' The consideration for the Court was not
based upon the integrity of the judge in question, or even the
character of the average judge, but on a "realistic appraisal of [the]
psychological tendencies and human weakness" of the "average
man."" 6 Justice Kennedy also focuses on this distinction to clarify
that Justice Benjamin's subjective findings on his ability to be a fair
and disinterested adjudicator are irrelevant when determining the
appearance of impartiality." 7
B. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)
The Caperton Court also looked to the holding in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie to show that a pecuniary interest may be
111. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 ("The Court was thus concerned with
more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct pecuniary interest. It
was also concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators
to disregard neutrality.").
112. See id. (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2255 (noting "[t]here is a serious risk of
actual bias when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by
raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending
or imminent.").
115. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
116. See supra notes 113, 115 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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more remote than common law had once mandated." 8 In Lavoie, the
Court found that due process was offended when an Alabama
Supreme Court Justice participated in a ruling whose facts were
substantially similar to an action the justice was bringing in a lower
court of the state.l19 The ruling was decided by one vote, and the
opinion was authored by Justice Embry, who had the similar case in
the State's lower court.120 The Alabama Supreme Court found that
Aetna Insurance had refused to pay a claim to the Lavoies in bad
faith, and upon remand the Lavoie family was awarded compensatory
and punitive damages which were consistent with Justice Embry's
opinion.121 The decision by the State's Supreme Court was made
even though "earlier opinions of the court had refused to allow bad-
faith suits in such circumstances." 22 Justice Embry, while writing
the opinion in the case and casting the deciding vote, was suing Blue
Cross Insurance for refusal to pay a claim in bad faith and also
seeking punitive damages. 12 3
118. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (stating, "[t]he Court in Lavoie further
clarified the reach of the Due Process Clause regarding a judge's financial interest
in a case.").
119. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 817 (1986) ("Justice Embry,
one of the five justices joining the per curiam opinion, had filed two actions in the
Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama, against insurance companies. Both
of these actions alleged bad-faith failure to pay a claim. . . . Both suits sought
punitive damages.").
120. Id. at 818 ("The deposition revealed that Justice Embry had authored the
per curiam opinion in this case over an 8- or 9-month period during which his civil
action against Blue Cross was being prosecuted.").
121. Id. at 816 ("On remand, appellees' bad-faith claim was submitted to a
jury. The jury awarded $3.5 million in punitive damages.").
122. Id.
123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
All of these issues were present in Justice Embry's lawsuit
against Blue Cross. His complaint sought recovery for partial
payment of claims. Also the very nature of Justice Embry's suit
placed in issue whether he would have to establish that he was
entitled to a directed verdict on the underlying claims that he
alleged Blue Cross refused to pay before gaining punitive
damages. Finally, the affirmance of the largest punitive damages
award ever (by a substantial margin) on precisely the type of
claim raised in the Blue Cross suit undoubtedly "raised the
stakes" for Blue Cross in that suit, to the benefit of Justice
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The majority in Caperton used Lavoie's interpretation of the Due
Process Clause as it pertained to a judge's pecuniary interests in the
outcome of a case.' 24 Chief Justice Burger expressed in Lavoie that
the interest need not be immediate or directly relayed from the
litigating parties to the judge.125  The Chief Justice reiterated the
basic protection guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution and their Due Process Clauses: "A judge may not
try a case where he has an interest in the outcome." 26  Justice
Kennedy also focused on the Lavoie Court's insistence on the use of
an objective test in determining a judge's impartiality, which is
echoed throughout the majority's opinion in Caperton.'27  Chief
Justice Burger articulated this point in Lavoie with the statement:
"[T]o perform its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice. "'128
Embry. Thus, Justice Embry's opinion for the Alabama Supreme
Court had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing both the
legal status and the settlement value of his own case.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 823-24. Before the ruling of the Supreme Court which
remanded the Lavoie case and required Justice Embry's disqualification, the Justice
received a thirty thousand dollar settlement from Blue Cross. See id. at 824.
124. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
125. See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 824.
Justice Embry's complaint against Blue Cross sought
'compensatory damage for breach of contract, inconvenience,
emotional and mental distress, disappointment, pain and
suffering' in addition to punitive damages for himself. . . . Soon
after the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court in this case was
announced, Blue Cross paid Justice Embry what he characterized
in an interview as 'a tidy sum' . . . .[T]he 'tidy sum' that Justice
Embry received directly is sufficient to establish the
substantiality of his interest here.
Id. at 824-25.
126. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 152, 170 and accompanying text.
128. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)).
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C. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)
Justice Kennedy and the majority also looked at the Court's
ruling from In re Murchison for direction.12 9 The judge in Murchison
did not have a pecuniary interest in conflict with the proceeding, but
had charged the defendants with criminal contempt and was then
later the judge who tried that contempt.130  Furthermore, at the
contempt hearing, the judge added testimony and information based
upon his recollection which was not included in the original court's
record.131 The judge refused the defense's motion to have the new
information stricken and, as common sense would dictate, it's highly
unlikely that a judge would be convinced by other witnesses that his
own interpretation of the event was inaccurate.132
In writing the majority opinion in Murchison, Justice Black
declared: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the
trial of cases." 33  Justice Black also noted actual bias need not be
129. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
130. Id. at 134.
131. Id. at 138.
In finding White guilty of contempt the trial judge said, "there is
one thing the record does not show, and that was Mr. White's
attitude, and I must say that his attitude was almost insolent in
the manner in which he answered questions and his attitude upon
the witness stand. . .. Not only was the personal attitude insolent,
but it was defiant, and I want to put that on the record."
Id.
132. See id. In answer to defense counsel's motion to strike these statements
because they were not part of the original record the judge said, "That is something
... that wouldn't appear on the record, but it would be very evident to the court."
Thus the judge whom due process requires to be impartial in weighing the evidence
presented before him, called on his own personal knowledge and impression of
what had occurred in the grand jury room and his judgment was based in part on
this impression, the accuracy of which could not be tested by adequate cross-
examination. Id.
133. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
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proven, because the Court must also be wary of the appearance of
bias for justice to be best served.134
The lack of a pecuniary or family interest in Murchison made the
ruling relevant to Caperton.'3 5  The basic consideration was that a
judge may not "try [a] case where he has an interest in the outcome,"
and that interest is dictated by the "[c]ircumstances and
relationships" which surround the matter.'3 6  The prior adverse
relationship that existed between the judge in Murchison and the
defendant was akin to the relationship which existed in Caperton
between Blakenship and Justice Benjamin. While the relationship
between Justice Benjamin and the head of Massey was not adverse
like the one in Murchison, neither the relationship's duration nor
Justice Benjamin's belief in his ability to be impartial mattered. The
important element, as expressed in Murchison, is that with an
existing relationship, "it is difficult[,] if not impossible[,] for a judge
to free himself from the influence of what [has taken] place."' 3 7 The
Court in Murchison stated: "no man can be a judge in his own
case."1 38 Justice Kennedy added to the rule by writing: "Just as no
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias
can arise when ... a man chooses thejudge in his own cause."1 39
134. See id. at 136-37 ("But our system of law has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness.... [T]o perform its high function in the
best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
135. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261 ("where a judge had no pecuniary interest in
the case but was challenged because of a conflict arising from his participation in
an earlier proceeding.").
136. Id. at 2261 ("It noted that the disqualifying criteria 'cannot be defined
with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered."' (quoting In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136)).
137. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
138. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
139. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137)
(emphasis added).
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Majority Opinion
"Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates
a probability of bias which requires a judge's recusal, but this is an
exceptional case."1 40  While writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy might have underestimated the importance of this case by
calling it "exceptional."' 4 1 As highlighted in both Chief Justice
Roberts' and Justice Scalia's dissents,14 2 the Due Process Clause had
never before been used to govern political contributions, because it is
an area usually controlled by state legislation or canon law.143
Nonetheless, as Justice Kennedy, who is joined in the opinion by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer notes, "a fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process," 44 and having a
judge indebted to a party arguing before him would seem to cast
doubt on that guarantee.145
While the majority opinion limits the ruling to "extraordinary
circumstances," the decision still expands the application of due
process in matters dealing with judicial recusal.146 While the issue
had not been addressed by the Court on due process grounds before,
the Court finds the Constitution applicable and explains its
application to judicial campaigns by stating:
As new problems have emerged that were not
discussed at common law,... the Court has identified
additional instances which, as an objective matter,
require recusal. These are circumstances 'in which
140. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (emphasis added). The court notes that
some "pecuniary interests" are "too remote and insubstantial" to amount to a due
process violation. Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825-
26 (1986)).
141. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
142. See infra notes 215-16, 230 and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
145. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269.
146. See id. at 2262 ("This problem arises in the context of judicial elections,
a framework not presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.").
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experience teaches that the probability of actual bias
on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high
to be constitutionally tolerable.' 47
Possibly, as the majority's analysis notes, the Constitution will
not be needed to address judicial campaign issues in the future,
especially with the reform movement which different state
legislatures have recently adopted, or are in the process of attempting
to ratify.148  However, the opinion creates a minimum amount of
protection for litigants by attempting, through the Constitution, to
provide "a fair trial in a fair tribunal," which individual states may
build upon through their own laws and codes of conduct.149
A critique stated in the majority's opinion, and often echoed in
law schools across the country, is that "hard cases make bad law." 50
While this decision creates new precedent and application for the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court addresses
this possibly perceived ill with the statement: "It is true that extreme
cases often test the bounds of established legal principles, . . . [b]ut it
is also true that extreme cases are more likely to cross constitutional
limits, requiring this Court's intervention and formulation of
objective standards. This is particularly true when due process is
violated."15'
1. Need For An Objective Test
Even the threat of "judicial campaign abuse" will detract from the
"public['s] confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's
147. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
47 (1975)).
148. See supra notes 48-55, 59, 61, 73, 78-79 and accompanying text.
149. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
150. See id. at 2272 & 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia notes: "The
relevant question, however, is whether we do more good than harm by seeking to
correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional mandate in a
manner ungoverned by any discernable rule. The answer is obvious." Id. at 2275
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 2265.
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elected judges."' 52 For this reason, the Court applied an objective
standard to situations which could require recusal of a judge who
receives contributions towards his campaign and then is left to judge
one of his contributors.s 3  The public's confidence in America's
legal system is already strained, and the Court should protect the law
from further disenchantment. 5 4 Additionally, the review process of
a judge's refusal to recuse himself and the difficulty in discovering
actual evidence of bias, makes an objective standard not just
preferable, but necessary.15 5 The majority opinion realizes that with
the application of this standard, some judges who are unbiased and
who would try the matter in front of them as fairly as possible will
still be disqualified from hearing the case.156  Nevertheless, an
objective assessment still offers much more protection and an easier
application than its subjective counterpart. 5 7
As discussed above,' 5 8 not every political contribution received
by a judge during his candidacy will require him to recuse himself,
but only when "the contributor's influence on the election under all
the circumstances 'would offer a possible temptation to the
average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true,"' will recusal be required.159  The Court listed a non-
exclusive list of factors for consideration which might show when
152. Id. at 2266. "Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the
highest order." (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Id. at 2267.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 2266-67 (noting that "[t]he citizen's respect for judgments
depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity." (quoting Republican
Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
155. See id. at 2263 (stating, "[t]he difficulties of inquiring into actual bias,
and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need for
objective rules ... The judge's own inquiry into actual bias, then, is not one that the
law can easily superintend or review.").
156. Id. at 2265 (noting that "[o]bjective standards may also require recusal
whether or not actual bias exists or can be proved. Due process 'may sometimes
bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to
weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties."' (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136)).
157. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct at 2265.
158. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
159. Caperton, 129 S. Ct at 2264 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
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such "influence" on a judge could rise to violate due process
standards.160 Those factors include: (1) "the contribution's relative
size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the
campaign"; (2) "the total amount spent in the election"; and (3) "the
apparent effect such [a] contribution had on the outcome of the
election," which can include the closeness of the election and the
"[t]emporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the
justice's election, and the pendency of the case . . . ."161
By weighing these considerations through a "totality of the
circumstances"' 62 analysis and by applying "a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness," the Court found the
"risk of actual bias or prejudgment [was too high, and] must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process [wa]s to be adequately
implemented." 63  Not discounting Justice Benjamin's subjective
analysis into his own actions or possible intentions, the Court
reiterates that while Justice Benjamin might be unaffected by the
contributions given to his campaign by Massey, the test still must be
an objective one.1 64  "The Court asks not whether the judge is
actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his
position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an
unconstitutional 'potential for bias."' 65
Justice Benjamin previously addressed this concern in his
concurring opinion with the Caperton ruling by the West Virginia
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. A totality of the circumstances test considers all the circumstances
pertaining to the alleged violation, rather than specified elements. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 726 (3d ed. 2006). While some factors may occur more frequently
than others, the relative importance of any one factor depends upon the particular
facts of the case, and the absence of a factor does not determine the outcome of the
test. Id. The test is also used to determine whether a defendant consented to a
warrantless search (see Bumper v. N.C., 391 U.S. 543 (1968)), and whether
probable cause exists for the issuing of a search warrant. See Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983).
163. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
47 (1975))(emphasis added).
164. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (stating, "[w]e do not question his
subjective findings of impartiality and propriety. Nor do we determine whether
there was actual bias.").
165. Id. at 2262.
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Supreme Court.166  Justice Benjamin argued that "[a]dopting 'a
standard merely of appearances,' . . . 'seems little more than an
invitation to subject West Virginia's justice system to the vagaries of
the day -- a framework in which predictability and stability yield to
supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations."'
67
This warning on the dangers of "opening Pandora's box" went
without heed from Kennedy and the rest of the majority, as they saw
an objective standard as the only acceptable option for review. 168
However, the admonition did seem to affect the dissenting judges,
especially Chief Justice Roberts, who lists in his dissent forty reasons
why the Court should not apply the objective standard.169  Still,
whether it's for the public's confidence or judicial convenience, the
objective standard was applied and will be used to govern future
cases (if needed) involving possible inappropriate campaign
contributions to elected adjudicators.170
2. Application Of The Objective Test
"A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety. "171 The Court found "the appearance of impropriety" to
be too strong to be permissible in Caperton.172  By applying the
factors listed above, 73 even giving Justice Benjamin the benefit of
the doubt in his ability to try the case fairly, Justice Kennedy and the
166. Id. at 2259 (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 2008 W. Va.
LEXIS 123 at *68 (W. Va Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2008)).
167. See supra note 24.
168. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
169. See infra note 209-212 and accompanying text.
170. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct at 2265-67. "[T]he Court articulated an
objective standard to protect the parties' basic right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal."
Id. at 2265-66.
171. Id. at 2266 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2004)).
172. MODEL CODEOF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. (2004) (stating,
"the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability
to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is
impaired.").
173. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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rest of the majority concluded the possible public outcry of foul play
was too high to be constitutionally permitted.17 4
a) Factor 1: Amount of money donated ($3 million)
The first factor considered by the court was the size of
Blankenship's contribution "in comparison to the total amount of
money contributed to the campaign."1 7 5  Blankenship spent three
million dollars to help get Justice Benjamin elected,176 and even
though not all of it was directly given to Justice Benjamin's
campaign committee, it was still used to help unseat the incumbent
Justice and secure a victory for Benjamin.'7 7  Most of the three
million dollars was funneled through the media,' newspaper ads,
and political organizations that also supported Benjamin.179
Additionally, Blankenship spent money on "direct mailings" sent to
174. See supra notes 152-154, 164, and accompanying text. See also
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (stating, "[w]e conclude that there is a serious risk of
actual bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptions.").
175. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
176. See id.
177. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
178. During the West Virginia 2004 judicial election, both parties spent much
of their money on TV ads that included lines like, "McGraw agreed to let this
convicted child rapist work as a janitor in a West Virginia school. Letting a child
rapist free to go work in our schools?" William Kistner, Justice for Sale?,
American Radio Works, http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/judges/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2009). Another ad which supported McGraw read:
Who is Brent Benjamin? The man a Daily Mail column says
"doesn't mind destroying a life to get what he wants." Who
really is Brent Benjamin? Someone who goes too far to get
elected, who is funded by out of state corporate interests who
expect him to rule for them on the supreme court and against
working people.
Id.
179. Caperton, 129 S. Ct at 2257 (noting that, "Blankenship donated almost
$2.5 million to 'And For The Sake Of The Kids,' a political organization formed
under 26 U.S.C. § 527. The § 527 organization opposed McGraw and supported
Benjamin.").
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West Virginia voters soliciting them for both their support of
Benjamin and to give money to his campaign.' 8 0
You might be thinking "so what, most political campaigns cost a
lot of money," but to give some context to just how imbalanced
Blankenship's contributions were, the Court included in the first
factor that the amount given be weighed as a ratio to the overall
contributions given.' 1  There was over a three to one ratio between
the amount of donations given by Blankenship, and the amount of
money spent by Benjamin's campaign committee. 182 Even with all
the funds raised through the direct mailings and the television and
newspaper advertisements (paid for by Blankenship), he still gave
one million dollars more to the Benjamin campaign than all the other
contributors combined.'18
b) Factor 2: The Big Picture
Similar to the first factor discussed above, the second factor also
considers the amount of money spent in the election. 184  The
difference between the two factors is the second one considers "the
total amount spent in the election," from both parties.' Through the
second factor the Court looks at more than just Justice Benjamin's
campaign spending, it also considers the amount of spending by
incumbent Justice McGraw.' 86 The combined amount spent between
Justice McGraw's committee and Justice Benjamin's was around five
million dollars, of which three million came from Blankenship.18 7
Even though Justice McGraw raised roughly one million dollars,
primarily through trial lawyers and unions,' 88 the amount paled in
comparison to the quantity given to Justice Benjamin by just one
contributor, Blankenship. In fact, in Caperton's brief to the Court, he
180. Id.
181. See supra note 175.
182. Caperton, 129 S. Ct at 2257.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 175-182, and accompanying text.
185. Caperton, 129 S. Ct at 2264.
186. Id.
187. See Kistner, supra note 178.
188. Id.
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claimed "Blankenship spent one million dollars more than the total
amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates
combined." 89
c) Factor 3: Did it Matter?
The last factor which the Court considered was the apparent
effect the contribution had on the outcome of the election.' 90 In a
race which was decided by less than fifty thousand votes, and a
margin smaller than four percent, the majority refused to believe that
Blankenship's contribution was nominal in its influence on result of
the election.' 9' Furthermore, the "temporal connection" between
Blankenship's contributions, the actual election, and the pendency of
Massey's appeal before the West Virginia Supreme Court were too
close to call coincidence or serendipity.' 92 Blankenship knew the
case would come before the state supreme court and, even though he
had given political contributions in the past, none had been to the
extent which was given to Benjamin's campaign.' 93
3. The Outcome, Putting It All Together
Just as "'no man can be a judge in his own case[,] . . . no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."'l
94
This concern was too much for the majority, as they noted by stating:
Justice Benjamin would review a judgment that cost
his biggest donor's company $50 million. Although
there is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement, the
fact remains that Blankenship's extraordinary
contributions were made at a time when he had a
189. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
1 90. Id.
191. Id. ("The vote differential was 382,036 to 334,301.").
192. See id.
193. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., Dissenting) (stating that "Blankenship has
made large expenditures in connection with several previous West Virginia
elections, which undercuts any notion that his involvement in this election was
'intended to influence the outcome' of particular pending litigation.").
194. Id. at 2261 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
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vested stake in the outcome. Just as no man is
allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears
of bias can arise when-without the consent of the
other parties - a man chooses the judge in his own
cause. 195
Viewing the "totality of the circumstances," and how they would
be perceived by the average person, the majority penned its decision
by writing: "We find that Blankenship's significant and
disproportionate influence-coupled with the temporal relationship
between the election and the pending case-'offer a possible
temptation to the average ... judge to .. . lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true.""
96
B. Dissenting Opinions
1. Chief Justice Roberts' Concerns and Questions
"Sometimes the cure is worse than the disease." 97 Chief Justice
Roberts used this old adage to recognize that, while appearances of
bias do indeed constitute a problem, it is not one that the
Constitution's Due Process Clause should remedy.198 While there are
no concurring opinions to the Caperton decision, Chief Justice
Roberts dissented to the holding and was joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito.199  The Chief Justice expressed the fear,
throughout his dissent, that the ruling could create an "unworkable
standard" which will have many more negative effects on the judicial
system than the positive ones.2 00 He articulated these concerns, even
195. Id. at 2265.
196. Id. at 2265 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
197. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., Dissenting).
198. See id. at 2267-74.
199. Id. at 2267.
200. Id
The Court's new "rule" provides no guidance to judges and
litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required.
This will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges
are biased, however groundless those charges may be. The end
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though the majority claimed the decision would be limited to cases
substantially similar to the claim at hand, which they predicted would
make them "exceedingly rare." 201 Not persuaded by the majority's
logic, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority's disclaimer of the
law being limited to the exceedingly rare facts of the case by
emphasizing that "[c]laims that have little chance of success are
nonetheless frequently filed." 2 02 Furthermore, using rulings like the
ones given in United States v. Halper,203 and Hudson v. United
States,204 the Chief Justice showed examples of how what the Court
at one time had considered to be only "rules for the rare case," 205
became rules commonly used by crafty lawyers to retard the legal
system.206
result will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial
impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.
Id. The court noted: "'[P]robability of bias'-fails to provide clear, workable
guidance for future cases. At the most basic level, it is unclear whether the new
probability of bias standard is somehow limited to financial support in judicial
elections, or applies to judicial recusal questions more generally." Id. at 2269.
201. Id. at 2272 ("[T]he Court seems to recognize that the inherently
boundless nature of its new rule poses a problem. But the majority's only answer is
that the present case is an "extreme" one, so there is no need to worry about other
cases.").
202. Id.
The success rate for certiorari petitions before this Court is
approximately 1.1%, and yet the previous Term some 8,241 were
filed. Every one of the "Caperton motions" or appeals or § 1983
actions will claim that the judge is biased, or probably biased,
bringing the judge and the judicial system into disrepute. And all
future litigants will assert that their case is really the most
extreme thus far.
Id.
203. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
204. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
205. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
206. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts listed out forty different
questions (just off the top of his head)207 which plague the majority's
rulings with uncertainties and make the decision unworkable for
future application. 208  Some of these concerns include: (1) whether
the amount in controversy of the actual case matter as opposed to the
campaign contribution;209 (2) whether the level of the court or
affirmation by a higher court matter; 210 (3) whether the amount of
time that has passed from the contribution being given to the time of
litigation change the consideration; 2 11 (4) if payments were made by
an organization to the campaign, whether the judge must recuse
himself whenever a member of that organization comes before him;
and (5) whether a judge must recuse himself whenever a party comes
before him who has contributed to an opponent's campaign? 212 Chief
Justice Roberts predicts that all of these unanswered questions, plus
the ones which future parties will be making through, or responding
to, "Caperton claims" will make the rule's application impossible and
leave courts with no guidance.2 13 Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts
criticizes the holding in that it seems to neglect the legal presumption
of judges being "impartial and fair," and instead relies upon
perception to govern recusal instead of a judge's honor.2 14
207. Id. at 2269-72. "These are only a few uncertainties that quickly come to
mind. Judges and litigants will surely encounter others when they are forced to, or
wish to, apply the majority's decision in different circumstances." Id. at 2273.
208. Id. ("The novel claim that we had recognized in Halper turned out not to
be so 'rare' after all, and the test we adopted in that case-'overwhelmingly
disproportionate'-had 'proved unworkable[]' . . . . The deja vu is enough to make
one swoon.").
209. Id. at 2269.
210. Id. at 2269-70.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2270.
213. Id. at 2273 ("I believe we will come to regret this decision [], when
courts are forced to deal with a wide variety of Caperton motions, each claiming
the title of 'most extreme' or 'most disproportionate."').
214. Id. at 2268 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)
("presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.")). "All
judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and
we trust that they will live up to this promise." Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002) (KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("We should not,
even by inadvertence, 'impute to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor"'
(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941))).
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In his dissent, although the Chief Justice questions the ruling
applicability, he does not claim nothing should be done, or that bias,
favor, or prejudice should be without remedy, but instead states its
cure should not be found in the Due Process Clause.215 To support
this assertion, Chief Justice Roberts points out that prior to this
decision, the Court found only two instances where the Due Process
Clause called for judicial recusal.216 Those two fact patterns included
when the judge had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, as
in Tumey,2 17 or in certain criminal contempt hearings when a judge
charges a person with contempt and then later is the same adjudicator
to try the contempt, as in In re Murchison.2 18 Chief Justice Roberts
distinguished the clarity of the law with regard to financial interest in
the outcome of the case, and contempt hearings from all the different
considerations which would need to be taken into account for finding
when a campaign contribution requires judicial recusal on Due
Process grounds.219  Additionally, the Chief Justice states several
examples of when the Due Process Clause does not require judicial
recusal, which include: kinship, personal bias, friendship, state
policy, and remoteness of interest.22 0  These issues dealing with
recusal are governed by legislation, state statutes, common law, state
ethical codes, and cannon law.22 1 The Chief Justice urged the Court
215. See id. at 2267 ("Vaguer notions of bias or the appearance of bias were
never a basis for disqualification, either at common law or under our constitutional
precedents. Those issues were instead addressed by legislation or court rules.").
216. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
217. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
218. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971)).
219. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2268 ("All questions of judicial qualification may not involve
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy,
remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative
discretion." (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
813, 820 (1986))). Chief Justice Roberts also stated that Due Process has never
before required recusal based off "friendship with a party or lawyer, prior
employment experience, membership in clubs or associations, prior speeches and
writings, religious affiliation, and countless other considerations." Caperton, 129
S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
221. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Subject to the
two well-established exceptions described above, questions of judicial recusal are
30-1
to let judicial campaign contributions also be governed by these
standards. 22 2 "Hard cases mak[ing] bad law," with the ruling creating
an impossible-to-apply precedent, was the Chief Justice's primary
concern.. 223 This concern was echoed by Justice Scalia in his
dissent.224
2. Justice Scalia's Argument of Judicial Uncertainty and Non-
Justiciability
Justice Scalia stressed that one of the Court's main purposes is to
create judicial certainty so lower courts are able to apply precedent
with confidence. 225  Expanding on Chief Justice Robert's dissent,
Justice Scalia warned of the likely possibility that "Caperton Claims"
will become just another weapon in a lawyer's arsenal in their
schemes to win legal battles on procedural grounds, instead of on the
merits.226 Justice Scalia also attacked the majority's reasoning in that
it would "preserve the public's confidence in the judicial system," by
claiming the decision would have the "opposite effect" by showing
litigation to be nothing more than style with no substance. 227
Justice Scalia, always the textualist,228 ended his dissatisfaction
with the majority's ruling by comparing religious writings with the
Constitution, and by stating the two styles should not be interpreted
similarly.229 While the Constitution gives guidance and addresses
many ills of American society, it does not answer all wrongs, unlike
regulated by 'common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and
bar."' (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904, (1997))).
222. See id.
223. Id. at 2272.
224. Id. at 2268.
225. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In interpreting Rule 10 of the United
States Supreme Court, Scalia noted, "The principal purpose of this Court's exercise
of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law." Id.
226. Id. (stating, "our seemingly interminable legal proceedings are
wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice. The
Court's opinion will reinforce that perception, adding to the vast arsenal of lawyerly
gambits what will come to be known as the Caperton claim.").
227. Id.
228. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI L. REV.
1175 (1989).
229. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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religious readings, and to try and make it do so can only cause
grief 230 Justice Scalia expresses this lesson with the statement:
Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all
earthly questions, but the Due Process Clause most
assuredly does not. The Court today continues its
quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all
imperfection through the Constitution. Alas, the quest
cannot succeed-which is why some wrongs and
imperfection have been called nonjusticable. . . . The
relevant question, however, is whether we do more
good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection
through expansion of our constitutional mandate in a
manner ungoverned by any discernable rule. The
answer is obvious.231
IV. THE EFFECT
A. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
Until January 21st of this year, it seemed the effect which the
Caperton ruling would have on the future of due process's
applicability towards elections would be minimal.232 However, with
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the
safeguard which Caperton offers seems much more relevant and
applicable.233 In Citizens United, the Court determined that the First
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2265 (stating, "[o]ur decision today addresses an extraordinary
situation where the Constitution requires recusal ... The parties point to no other
instance involving judicial campaign contributions that presents a potential for bias
comparable to the circumstances in this case.").
233. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled Hillary:
The Movie ... It is a 90-minute documentary about then-Senator
Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate in the Democratic Party's
2008 Presidential primary elections. Hillary mentions Senator
Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political
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Amendment's guarantees of free speech prohibit the government
from interfering with businesses' or corporations' ability to buy or
sponsor advertisements for or against a candidate for election. 234
Until the decision, the government had prohibited "corporations and
unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures for speech . .. expressly advocating [for] the election or
defeat of a candidate." 235
While the majority in Caperton repeatedly stressed the
importance of the public's perception of impartiality and the need to
preserve confidence against corruption,236 the Court in Citizens
United, which was predominately the same as the one in Caperton,
stated: "The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt." 237
The Court further concluded: "[I]ndependent expenditures, including
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption."238 Suddenly, the "appearance of
corruption" seems to be viewed differently than it was in
Caperton.2 39  The Citizens United Court explained the rule
commentators and other persons, most of them quite critical of
Senator Clinton.
Id. at 887.
234. Id. at 913 ("We return to the principle ... that the Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit
or for-profit corporations."). The Court did note that "[a]t least since the latter part
of the 19th century, the laws of some States and of the United States [has] imposed
a ban on corporate direct contributions to candidates." Id. at 900.
235. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). This restriction had ties that go back to 1907,
when President Theodore Roosevelt got congress to exclude corporations, railroads
and banks from using their money in federal election campaigns. David G. Savage,
Supreme Court overturns ban on direct corporate spending on elections, L.A.
Times, Jan. 21, 2010, at Al. Later this restriction was also extended to labor
unions. Id.
236. See supra notes 152-69 and accompanying text.
237. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
238. Id. at 884.
239. It would seem that the amount of money which corporations are able to
spend to advocate for a candidate would create a significant or disproportionate"
effect, which is why the amount of money spent in a campaign for election is one
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established by Caperton means a judge must recuse himself when a
contributor has a "significant or disproportionate" effect on the
outcome of the election, and that contributor has a matter which is
imminent to come before the court or is already pending.2 40 Justice
Kennedy, who also wrote the opinion in Citizens United,
distinguished the Caperton ruling by stating: "The remedy of recusal
was based on a litigant's due process right to a fair trial before an
unbiased judge ... Caperton's holding was limited to the rule that
the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's political speech
could be banned."24 1
As emphasized by Larry Flynt, speech, even when it is unpopular
and controversial, must be protected.242 In fact, that is when speech
needs the most protection. 24 3  However, as President Theodore
Roosevelt expressed throughout his time in office,244 and as many
people still feel, corporations are not people, they should not be given
the same rights as individuals, and protections should be put in place
of the factors for consideration discussed in Caperton. See supra note 175 and
accompanying text.
240. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (noting that "Caperton held that a
judge was required to recuse himself 'when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge
on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent."') (quoting Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64).
241. Id. The Court found that once corporations were found to have free
speech rights, the Government may not completely suppress those rights, but
instead may only regulate them through "disclaimer and disclosure requirements."
Id. at 769.
242. See Hustler Magazine, v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In Falwell, Jerry
Falwell sued Hustler Magazine and its owner Larry Flynt for publishing an
advertisement in the magazine that parodied Falwell as being an alcoholic whose
first sexual experience came with his mother in an outhouse. Id. at 47.
243. See Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 711 (8th Cir. 2000). The Supreme
Court ruled that even the Ku Klux Klan has free speech rights, because "the First
Amendment protects everyone, even those with viewpoints as thoroughly
obnoxious as those of the Klan, from viewpoint-based discrimination by the State."
Id. The significance of the Cuffley decision is that it further emphasizes the point
that the government cannot exclude certain groups because their religious or
political views are objectionable. See generally id. The protection of "thoroughly
obnoxious groups" helps protect the ability for everyone to express their views and
associate with others freely without the fear of government interruption or
censorship. Id. at 712.
244. See Savage, supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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to ward off their power to "drown out" the voices of individuals with
the corporation's seemingly endless resources. 245  Corporations,
unlike individuals, cannot vote, go to jail, or be drafted to serve in the
military.246  As shown in Caperton, money used for campaign
advertisements to support or advocate against a candidate can have a
significant impact on the outcome of an election.247 It is rare for an
individual's voice to have the same financial backing as a
corporation's.
While the Court in Citizens United focuses on protecting free
speech, the effect the decision could have on elections-including
judicial campaigns-is readily apparent. 248  The Court ruled that
corporate contributions to a candidate's campaign, or the use of
corporate funds to advocate for that candidate through advertisements
is "[p]olitical speech, [which] must be protected from the 'chilling
effect' of government regulation. "249 However, a for-profit
corporation is exactly that (for profit), which could cause its
campaign efforts to be seen as a business decision which can be
interpreted as "commercial speech." Commercial speech is not given
the same protections by the First Amendment as the ones afforded to
political speech. 250 Nevertheless, that discussion is for an entirely
different legal article.
245. Jim Sleeper, Corporate free speech? Since when?, The Boston Globe,
Sept. 5, 2009, at Al.
246. Id.
247. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64.
248. See generally id.; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. at 910
(stating that "a judge [is] required to recuse himself 'when a person with a personal
stake in a particular case ha[s] a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election
campaign . . ..') (quoting Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64).
249. Id. at 894 ("Any other course of decision would prolong the substantial,
nation-wide chilling effect caused by § 441b's prohibitions on corporate
expenditures."). Id.
250. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (In Valentine the
Supreme Court ruled that commercial speech is not protected under the First
Amendment).
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B. More States Moving Towards Judicial Nominations?
Caperton, and the controversy it provided, furthers the argument
for judicial nominations as opposed to elections. 25 1 This option
seems to be strengthened with the Citizens United decision and the
influence which corporations may now impose on judicial
elections. 252 While Caperton offers protection against such influence
and the possibility of corruption, the "tracking" of such information
as to who made what contributions and how much, will still permit
many contributors to go unnoticed or remain unaffected by the
analysis explained in Caperton.2 53 Furthermore, the recusal reform
steps which are being taken by many state legislators dealing with
judges and campaign contributions will vary greatly and could deter
corporations from incorporating in certain states where it may not be
as easy to influence elections. 2 54 This type of "forum shopping" for a
state of incorporation could be another heavy blow to the economies
of those states which are not chosen, many of which are already
feeling the strong effects of the current recession.
When the Institute on Money in State Politics did a study
comparing the lists of "actual contributors to the lists of people who
show up in [state] Supreme Court cases," they found that seventy five
percent of the cases involved at least one contributor.25 5
Additionally, in the 2004 judicial elections, more than forty-five
million dollars was spent, which surpassed the record set in 2000.256
The money was spent to elect forty-three judges in just twenty
states.257 "The campaign money mainly came from business interests
and their trial lawyer and union opponents." 258 These studies show
that parties involved in litigation are more than ever in need of
protection to guarantee them their "fair trial in a fair tribunal."259
251. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.




259. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, the decision in Caperton balances out the one
provided in Citizens United, at least when the matter concerns
judicial campaigns and the money given by contributors. The effect,
for now, can only be speculated (as shown above), but whether it be
by state legislation or the case's due process extension, parties that
find themselves in American courts will at least have a defense
against the possibility of bias by an adjudicator who finds himself
judging one of his contributors. Even with large campaign
contributions, many judges will do their best to uphold their oaths of
being impartial and blindly serving justice, as the majority in
Caperton emphasizes, but there is a comfort in having the added
protection the decision gives; especially because for many litigants,
appearances do matter.260
In most Grisham books, the story line is all cleaned up at the end.
The frantic scrambling to resolve the issue is settled, and balanced is
restored. In The Last Juror, the killer is discovered and the small
town news writer goes back to having lunch with his good friend.26'
In The Appeal, the head of the Krane Chemical, Carl Trudeua,
finishes the story by sailing down the Hudson on his mega yacht
surrounded by New York's elite, as he sips champagne and laughs at
those who had doubted him after the trial court's decision; well he
had got it all back, all back and more.262 So, too, here were things
cleaned up, only this time with a different ending than that given in
260. See supra notes 53, 152 and accompanying text.
261. JOHN GRISHAM, THE LAST JUROR (2004).
262. See GRISHAM, supra note 1, at 355.
The great Carl Trudeau had outfoxed them again. He'd cleaned
up the Bowmore mess and saved his company. He'd driven its
stock into the ground, bought it cheap at a fire sale, and now
owned virtually all of it. It was making him even richer. He was
destined to move up the Forbes 400 list, and as Carl sailed along
the Hudson at the very top of his extraordinary ship, and gazed
with smug satisfaction at the gleaming towers packed around
Wall Street, he admitted to himself that nothing else mattered.
Now that he had three billion, he really wanted six.
Id.
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The Appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to West Virginia
to be tried without Justice Benjamin's involvement.263 The ruling
does not promise the trial court's decision will be upheld, but it at
least gives some assurance to both Caperton and Americans that due
process is still guaranteed, a "fair trial in a fair tribunal" cannot be so
easily bypassed, and that justices are not able to be bought as easily
as a New York Times "best seller."
263. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
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